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Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical and empirical framework to assess the heterogeneous effects
of mortgage rates on housing returns when accounting for the zero lower bound regime of the policy
interest rate and state-level supply and demand conditions. Based on an interacted panel VAR, estimated
on a dataset comprising of all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia for a time period between
January 1995 and December 2020, our empirical findings show that the response of housing returns
to a mortgage rate shock is larger in magnitude when the federal funds rate is at its zero lower bound.
Various supply and demand conditions, including housing permits, personal income, employment, and
population, matter for the transmission of a mortgage rate shock to housing returns in local markets. A
partial equilibrium model supports our empirical results.
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In this paper, we build a simple partial equilibrium model of housing based upon Glaeser et al. (2008)
to understand the effects of changes in mortgage rates on regional housing returns. The supply side of
the model is composed of existing homeowners and developers, who sell old and new houses respectively.
Housing demand is determined by new home buyers and their decision to purchase a home, which is in-
fluenced by the utility derived from living in a region and the expected capital gains from owning a home
in the region. The equilibrium condition shows that mortgage rate shocks have heterogeneous effects on
housing returns conditional on the monetary policy regime, local supply and demand factors, and their
interactions. Based on these theoretical observations, we estimate an interacted panel vector autoregres-
sion (IPVAR) model, as outlined in Towbin and Weber (2013), to empirically test the impact of various
housing supply and demand determinants at the state level, including housing permits, real personal in-
come, employment, and population, on housing returns following a mortgage rate shock. Furthermore,
the IPVAR approach allows us to account for the zero lower bound (ZLB) regime of the federal funds rate
and measure its implications for a mortgage rate shock and its impact on housing returns in the presence
of heterogeneous supply and demand forces.
Our empirical results show that the response of housing returns to a mortgage rate shock is amplified
in the ZLB regime of monetary policy. At its maximum impact, the ZLB response is double the size of
the non-ZLB response. In other words, if mortgage rates are lowered, housing returns expand by twice the
amount when the policy rate is near its lower bound of zero. Furthermore, the mortgage rate shock is more
persistent and its effects are longer-lasting in an environment where the federal funds rate is close to zero.
These results are in line with the ongoing housing boom in the U.S., accompanied by declining mortgage
rates throughout 2019-2020 and a cut in the federal funds rate to a range of 0-0.25 percent in early 2020,
as a measure to combat the economic side effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Allowing for supply and
demand conditions and their interactions with the ZLB regime of monetary policy confirms the presence
of heterogeneous effects of a mortgage rate shock on housing returns across regions. A negative mortgage
rate shock triggers a larger increase in housing returns in states with lower housing permits or higher
personal income, employment, and population, especially when the federal funds rate is near zero. The
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estimation results therefore provide strong evidence for a significant, heterogeneous response of housing
returns to a mortgage rate shock and confirm the theoretical predictions derived from our simple partial
equilibrium model.
Our findings can be traced back to the early contributions made by McAvinchey and Maclennan (1982)
and Segal and Srinivasan (1985), both focus on the causes of remarkable cross-region variation in housing
price inflation. McAvinchey and Maclennan (1982) examine the rate of housing price inflation across
11 geographic regions of the British housing market between 1967 and 1976. Performing regressions
of linear functional form and allowing for supply (housing starts and completions) and demand factors
(population and income growth), the study observes significant regional differences when it comes to the
impact of mortgage rates. Using a sample of 51 metropolitan areas in the U.S. between 1975 and 1978,
Segal and Srinivasan (1985) find that demand-side factors (income, population, and mortgage rates) have
a significant influence on housing price inflation and 40% of the variations, which are unexplained by
demand-side factors, can be attributed to supply-side factors (suburban growth restrictions on potentially
developed land). A series of studies, including Bartik (1991), Poterba et al. (1991), Abraham and Hender-
shott (1996), Jud and Winkler (2002), Meese and Wallace (2003), Capozza et al. (2004), and Hwang and
Quigley (2006), further investigate the dynamics of housing prices and the impact of supply and demand
conditions. While these studies in the regional economics literature provide abundant evidence of hetero-
geneous responses of housing returns to a mortgage rate shock across geographic regions, none of them
have considered the effects of monetary policy regime, and how it interacts with local supply and demand
conditions.
The zero lower bound regime of monetary policy has become a hot topic for macroeconomic research
over the last decade. Assessing the effect of monetary policy becomes more challenging in the aftermath
of the Great Recession (Hamilton and Wu, 2012; Wu and Xia, 2016). Even though the goal of our paper
is not to evaluate the monetary policy effects in a zero lower bound environment, we still find theoretical
and empirical evidence of asymmetric effects of mortgage rates on housing returns between non-ZLB
and ZLB regimes of monetary policy, and significant heterogeneity across geographic regions. Our paper
is therefore related to a strand of literature which investigates the interplay between housing/real estate
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developments and the heterogeneous effects of monetary policy across regions. In addition to this, our
research is also linked to another strand of literature which investigates the effectiveness of monetary
policy over the business cycle.
Within the first strand of literature, the housing market has been identified as an important channel
through which monetary policy impacts real economic activity with differential effects across regions.
Monetary policy actions affect mortgage rates, which further affect disposable income and consumption
through both direct (cash flow effect) and indirect (wealth effect) channels (Elbourne, 2008; Caplin et al.,
1997; Beraja et al., 2019; Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). Fratantoni and
Schuh (2003) find that incorporating sources of heterogeneity along with housing yields greater cross-
region differences in the effect of monetary policy. Furceri et al. (2019) provide empirical evidence of
how asymmetries in the impact of monetary policy shocks across U.S. states can be explained by industry
mix, share of small firms, share of small banks, and housing conditions. Regarding the impact of monetary
policy on regional housing markets, Christidou et al. (2011) estimate VAR models for the period 1988-
2009 and their results suggest that housing markets across U.S. states respond differently to a common
monetary policy shock. Füss and Zietz (2016) provide further evidence on the heterogeneous effect of
monetary policy on housing returns across metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) by interacting MSA-
specific demand and supply conditions with monetary policy.
The second strand of literature examines the effectiveness of monetary policy over the business cycle.
Garcia and Schaller (2002) study the asymmetric effects of monetary policy during expansions and reces-
sions with the help of an estimated Markov switching model. Interest rate changes are found to have a
stronger impact on output growth during recessions compared to periods of expansion. The results are in
line with the previous findings by Weise (1999), who estimates a nonlinear VAR model to show that money
supply shocks have larger output and weaker price effects, when output growth is initially low. Similarly,
Lo and Piger (2005) find strong evidence that monetary policy measures applied during recessions have
a stronger impact on output compared to those applied during expansions.1 In contrast, Tenreyro and
Thwaites (2016) reach the opposite conclusion, that is, monetary policy is less effective during recessions.
1In the REITs market, Glascock and Lu-Andrews (2014) also find that macroeconomic factors have stronger effects on the
pricing of REIT liquidity during recessions.
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Regarding the asymmetric effects of mortgage rates on housing prices over the business cycle, Kim and
Bhattacharya (2009) find that mortgage rates have a stronger impact on home prices when the housing
market is in an upswing rather than in a downswing. In the light of this asymmetry, the study further finds
strong support for Granger causality from mortgage rates to house prices.
While our paper is related to the asymmetry in the effects of mortgages rates on housing prices over the
business cycle, we focus on the ZLB and non-ZLB regimes of monetary policy rather than general business
cycles. We contribute to the existing literature in three dimensions. First, we present a simple theoretical
model to analyze the response of housing returns to changes in mortgage rates whilst accounting for
the monetary policy regime and regional supply and demand differences. Second, we use an IPVAR
approach to empirically test and further investigate the predictions of our theoretical model by interacting
supply and demand conditions with changing policy interest rate environments, which allows us to analyze
the heterogeneous effects of a mortgage rate shock on housing returns. Third, the sample end date of
our dataset is December 2020, which means that we include important information about recent housing
market fluctuations during the Covid-19 pandemic into our study and therefore our findings add to the
ongoing policy debate.
Our results hold important policy implications, given that the Federal Reserve is committed to its
zero-interest-rate policy until 2024, as repeatedly signalled by chairman Jerome Powell,2 but with current
mortgage rates on the rise. In the light of our findings, this may result in negative ramifications for the
housing sector. Although the U.S. housing market is experiencing surging prices at the time of writing this
paper, the surge could be caused by the fiscal expansion during the Covid-19 pandemic and the prolonged
effects of declining mortgage rates in both 2019 and 2020. As the economy remains in the ZLB envi-
ronment and mortgage rates keep going up, we would expect a more pronounced contraction of housing
returns at some point in time. Additionally, these developments unfold in a time where the U.S. economy
suffers from the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result of this, households face now a much
more complex financial environment. For example, a household’s financial situation may be altered due
to job loss or as the mortgage forbearance ends. As more and more consumers are wondering if we are
2See the March 2021 Financial Times article “Fed Signals No Rate Rise Until At Least 2024 Despite Growth Upgrade" at
https://www.ft.com/content/3d7704d3-a312-4294-95bc-90233f469ccd.
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headed for a housing market crash, our results point out the importance of avoiding a rapid climb of mort-
gage rates in a near zero policy rate environment, which for example can be achieved through large scale
asset purchases better known as quantitative easing. However, this will challenge the Fed’s current plan
of reducing its monthly purchases of mortgage-backed securities, given inflation pressures, before raising
the policy rate.3
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 derives a simple partial equilibrium model to il-
lustrate the heterogeneous effects of a mortgage rate shock on local housing returns. Section 3 presents
the data used for the estimation of our IPVAR model and discusses in detail the underlying VAR method-
ology. Section 4 analyzes the empirical results and impulse response functions of the estimated IPVAR
framework. Section 5 concludes.
2 Heterogeneous effects of mortgage rates on housing returns
In order to illustrate how regional housing returns respond to a change in the mortgage rate, we tailor
the simple partial equilibrium model of Glaeser et al. (2008) to incorporate heterogeneous expectations
of house price growth. In this model, the house price in a region, or a state in our context, is jointly
determined by supply and demand of the regional housing market. Housing supply is given by the total
amount of old houses being sold by existing homeowners and new houses produced by developers. For the
sake of simplicity, both types of housing are assumed to be physically identical. Housing demand comes
from a group of potential new homebuyers, whose willingness to pay is determined by the utility gains
from living in the region and the expected capital gains from owning a house in the same region.
Let H(t) and I(t) denote the stock of houses and the flow of new housing construction in the region
at time t, respectively. The marginal cost of housing production is assumed to be a linear function of the
size of construction c0 + c1 I(t) where c1 > 0. At any point in time, as long as there is new construction
of housing, price and marginal cost must be equal in equilibrium, i.e., P(t) = c0 + c1 I(t). As in Sun
3See the April 2021 Wall Street Journal article “Central Bank Will Begin Reducing Bond Purchases ‘Well Before’ Raising
Interest Rates, Powell Says" at https://www.wsj.com/articles/central-bank-will-begin-reducing-bond-purchases-well-before-
raising-interest-rates-powell-says-11618421656.
6
and Tsang (2019), an increase in c1 can be interpreted as a negative supply shock that reduces housing
production and a decrease in c1 captures a positive supply shock. Existing homeowners in the region are
assumed to receive a Poisson-distributed shock with probability λ in each period that forces them to sell
their houses, leave the region, and receive zero utility for the rest of their lives. Under this assumption,
housing supply at time t is given by S(t) = λH(t) + I(t).
There exist a fixed number of potential home buyers at any point in time. These potential buyers are
heterogeneous in terms of their utility gains from living in the region. The utility of potential buyer i from
living in the region, u(i), is assumed to follow a uniform distribution on the interval [u, ν0] with density
1/ν1, where ν1 > 0. Let u∗(t) denote the utility of the marginal buyer at time t, potential buyers with
utility above u∗(t) choose to purchase a house in the region while others do not. Housing demand is
therefore given by Dt = (ν0 − u∗(t))/ν1. Following Sun and Tsang (2019), we interpret an increase
in ν1 as a negative housing demand shock and a decrease in ν1 as a positive demand shock. Given the
mortgage rate r, potential buyer i’s expected utility flow at time t is the sum of the utility gains from living









where Et(·) denotes expectations as of time t. Potential buyers will keep moving into the region until the
expected utility flow diminishes to zero.
Putting the supply and demand sides of the market together yields the following equilibrium condi-
tions:
S(t) = D(t), (1)










Suppose that, at time t, the region has reached its long-run steady state with H(t) = ν0−rc0λν1 and
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P(t) = c0. Following Glaeser et al. (2008), individuals are assumed to update their beliefs at discrete
intervals. Let ϵ be the expected growth rate of house prices at time t. During a period when beliefs about








e−(r+λ)(x−t)λ(P(t) + ϵ · (x − t))dx
)
. (4)
Equalizing supply and demand of the regional housing market gives rise to the house price at time
t + 1:
P(t + 1) = c0 +
ϵλc1
(rc1 + ν1 + λν1)(r + λ)
. (5)
The appreciation in house price, or housing return, from t to t + 1 is then given by:
∆P =
ϵλc1
(rc1 + ν1 + λν1)(r + λ)
. (6)
The marginal effects of mortgage rates on future housing returns can be derived as:
∂∆P
∂r
= −ϵλc1(2rc1 + λc1 + ν1 + λν1)
(rc1 + ν1 + λν1)2(r + λ)2
. (7)
Equation (7) indicates that housing returns will increase (decrease) following a decline (rise) in the
mortgage rate and the marginal effects depend on the size of the expected growth rate of house prices ϵ;
they also depend on parameters c1 and ν1 that capture housing supply and demand conditions, as well as
their interactions with ϵ. It has been shown in the literature, initially driven by the bull housing market in
the 1970s, that nominal interest rates play an important role in the formation of house price appreciation
expectations. The 1970s were a period of rising interest rates, accompanied by rising inflation, during
which the demand for ownership was stimulated; see Frieden et al. (1977), Hendershott and Hu (1979),
and Schwab (1982) among many others. As Harris (1989) points out, expectations of a future interest rate
8
hike, increase the desire for home ownership and thereby the expected growth rate of house prices. Facing
potentially higher interest rates in the future, risk averse households tend to purchase a home in order
to fix future housing costs and hedge against rent risk; see Kau and Keenan (1980), Sinai and Souleles
(2005), and Elgin and Uras (2014). Hence, the expected growth rate of house prices ϵ strongly relates to
the monetary policy regime. When nominal interest rates are near zero, households tend to expect interest
rates to be higher in the future. First, being around the lower bound of zero already, nominal interest rates
have little to no room to be further reduced. Second, a monetary expansion is likely to result in inflation
which will cause the central bank to raise interest rates afterwards. The expected growth rate of house
prices ϵ therefore tends to be higher at the ZLB of nominal interest rates.
Given higher expectations of future house price growth at the ZLB regime of monetary policy, we have
the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: A mortgage rate shock has heterogeneous effects on housing returns conditional on the
monetary policy regime. Other things equal, the marginal effects of a mortgage rate shock on housing
returns are larger at the ZLB of nominal interest rates.
Hypothesis 2: A mortgage rate shock has heterogeneous effects on housing returns conditional on the
monetary policy regime, local supply and demand conditions, and their interactions.
To better illustrate the heterogeneous effects of a mortgage rate shock on housing returns, we calibrate
the model parameters to reasonable values and plot future housing returns as shown in Equation (6) against
hypothetical values of the mortgage rate in Figure 1.
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(a) Effects of ZLB and supply conditions





































(b) Effects of ZLB and demand conditions
Figure 1: Future housing returns and mortgage rates
In the baseline scenario, we choose λ = 0.05, r = 0.06, ν1 = 1, and c1 = 165/62.4 We consider
an expected growth rate of house prices of ϵ = 0.05 during normal times and a considerably higher
expectation of ϵ = 0.10 when nominal interest rates are stuck at the lower bound of zero. The solid
lines in black and red in both panels depict the effects of mortgage rates on future housing returns in the
non-ZLB and ZLB regimes of monetary policy, respectively. In line with our expectation, the red line is
steeper than the black line, which indicates larger marginal effects in magnitude of a mortgage rate shock
on housing returns at the ZLB of nominal interest rates.
Not all regions are impacted equally. To account for regional differences, we simulate a region with
lower housing supply by doubling the parameter c1 in Panel (a) and a region with higher housing demand
by halving the parameter ν1 in Panel (b), while leaving other parameters unchanged. The dashed lines
in black and red outline the effects of mortgage rates on future housing returns in the non-ZLB and ZLB
regimes of nominal interest rates, respectively. As Panel (a) shows, compared to the baseline region,
housing returns are more responsive to a mortgage rate shock in the region with lower housing supply,
especially in the ZLB regime of monetary policy. Similarly, Panel (b) suggests higher responsiveness of
4These values correspond to a 5% probability of selling the house and leaving the region in each period, a 6% mortgage
rate, and a density one of a potential buyer’s utility. The value of c1 is selected to equalize the future housing return in Equation
(6) and the expectation ϵ in the long-run steady state.
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housing returns to a mortgage rate shock in the region with higher housing demand, especially in the ZLB
regime of monetary policy.
3 Data and Methodology
To empirically test the hypotheses developed in the previous section, we utilize an IPVAR model and
estimate the response of housing returns to a mortgage rate shock and its dependence on the ZLB regime
of the policy interest rate and local housing supply and demand conditions. On the demand side, we
choose three variables, namely real personal income, nonfarm employment, and population, which have
been found to direct influence housing price appreciation, while on the supply side we use the number of
housing permits; see Mayer and Somerville (2000), Strauss (2013), and the references discussed in the
introduction.
3.1 Data description
We use monthly data of 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia from 1995 to 2020. Our sample
covers a long period of near zero federal funds rates from 2008 to 2015 and the ongoing ZLB that started
in April 2020 following the global outbreak of Covid-19. Seasonally adjusted house price indices are
obtained from Freddie Mac. Compared to other commonly referenced house price indices, such as the
Federal Housing Finance Agency and the S&P/Case-Shiller indices, the Freddie Mac House Price Index
includes not only purchase transactions but also appraisal values used for refinance transactions. The
federal funds rate and the 30-year fixed rate mortgage average are retrieved from the Federal Reserve
Economic Data; the former rate is only used for defining the ZLB dummy variable and the later is one
of the endogenous variables in the IPVAR model. The number of housing permits is extracted from the
Building Permits Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. The number of employees in the nonfarm
sector is obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Personal income at quarterly frequency and
population at annual frequency are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.5 Both house
5Instead of using interpolation to match the frequency of all other variables, we use quarterly data of personal income and
annual data of population for each month in a certain quarter or year. This is not of much concern given that our focus is to
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price and personal income data are deflated with the chain-type price index for personal consumption
expenditures obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
3.2 IPVAR model
In order to examine the conditional responses of housing returns to a mortgage rate shock, we estimate
















where MRt is the mortgage rate (i.e., the 30-year fixed rate mortgage average) in period t, which is
common across states, and HRit is the real housing return for state i in period t, calculated as the log
difference of real house price. The vectors µi and uit denote state-specific intercepts and independent and
identically distributed shocks. L is the number of lags.
An implicit assumption imposed on Equation (8) is that the 30-year fixed rate mortgage average does
not depend on state-level housing returns, i.e., α12l,it = 0 for l = 0, ..., L. This exogeneity assumption
tends to hold for two reasons. First, the mortgage rate is a national-level variable which is impacted by
conditions of any single state to a negligible extent. Second, the mortgage rate is affected by the Fed’s
monetary policy, usually with a delay, and the literature has shown no evidence that the Fed responds to
house price movements; see Sun and Tsang (2014). While mortgage rates vary across states, the magnitude
of regional differences is small and statistically insignificant; see Ozanne and Thibodeau (1983), Jud and
Epley (1991), and Kim and Bhattacharya (2009). We use the average 30-year mortgage rates in our
IPVAR model in order to properly identify an exogenous mortgage rate shock. Section 4.3 provides a
further discussion on this matter.
In Equation (8), αjkl,it (l = 0, ..., L) are deterministically varying coefficients. To examine how responses
of housing returns to a mortgage rate shock vary with the monetary policy regime and state-level housing
supply and demand characteristics, we allow these coefficients to be linear functions of a ZLBt dummy,
capture the heterogeneity of supply and demand conditions across states.
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l,2 · ZLBt + β
jk
l,3 · Xit + β
jk
l,4 · ZLBt · Xit, (9)
where ZLBt is the zero lower bound dummy in period t that equals one if the federal funds rate lies in
the 0% to 0.25% interval and zero otherwise; the variable Xit captures the supply and demand character-
istics of the local housing market, namely the number of housing permits, real personal income, nonfarm
employment, and population for state i in period t.
It is worth noting that we use the ZLB indicator with a stronger focus on the potential long-lasting
effects of a mortgage rate shock. The ZLB dummy captures both the state of the macroeconomy and
the monetary policy environment. This indicator is different from more short-lived recession indexes,
such as the NBER recession indicator. The ZLB regime covers not only a severe recession but also the
initial stage of an economic recovery from the recession, which better matches the period of time during
which individuals raise expectations of house price growth in our partial equilibrium model presented in
Section 2. Over our sample period, the ZLB indicator takes the value one between December 2008 and
December 2015 and from April 2020 onward, which covers both the Great Recession and the ongoing
Covid-19 recession. The only NBER recession excluded by the ZLB indicator is the Dot-com recession
between March and November 2001, which is considerably less severe and shorter-lived than the later two
recessions.
Table 1: Unit root test
Variable Transformation Unit root test
Mortgage rate Linear trend removed -2.878 (p=0.004)
Housing returns 1272.38 (p=0.000)
Housing permits Log transformation of one plus the number of permits 837.481 (p=0.000)
Personal income State-specific linear trend removed from log transformation 295.315 (p=0.000)
Employment State-specific linear trend removed from log transformation 243.980 (p=0.000)
Population State-specific linear trend removed from log transformation 132.914 (p=0.022)
The null hypothesis is defined as the presence of a unit root (assuming individual unit root process for panel data).
The mortgage rate variable is common to all states and, over our sample period, it exhibits a significant
downward trend. We remove a linear trend from the mortgage rate data and the detrended mortgage rate
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is stationary according to the PP unit root test (Phillips and Perron, 1988). Housing returns are stationary
based on the results of the Fisher-PP unit root test for panel data (Maddala and Wu, 1999; Choi, 2001); see
Table 1. Housing permits, personal income, employment, and population are all log transformed. One is
added to the number of housing permits before taking the natural log as there are zero-valued observations
of housing permits in our sample for the District of Columbia. The log transformed housing permits
variable does not have a linear trend and it is found to be stationary. We remove state-specific linear trends
from the log-transformed personal income, employment, and population so that all housing demand and
supply factors are stationary based on the Fisher-PP panel unit root test. This stationarity condition is
particularly critical for interacted VAR results to be meaningful; see Towbin and Weber (2013). Note that,
in order to capture the cross-state heterogeneity, we do not remove the level information in the data. The
summary statistics of model variables are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max 10th Pct 90th Pct
Mortgage rate 0.0556 0.0057 0.0429 0.0705 0.0430 0.0690
Housing returns 0.0016 0.0054 -0.0348 0.0345 -0.0336 0.0336
Housing permits 6.6335 1.3430 0.0000 9.9057 0.0000 9.8718
Personal income 11.9087 1.0430 9.9808 14.4503 9.9904 14.4429
Employment 7.4108 0.9883 5.4266 9.6738 5.4320 9.6722
Population 15.0910 1.0304 13.1523 17.4250 13.1539 17.4243
4 Empirical Results
4.1 ZLB vs non-ZLB regimes
We start with the ZLB versus non-ZLB responses of housing returns to a negative one-standard-
deviation shock to the mortgage rate by setting βjkl,3 = β
jk
l,4 = 0 in Equation (9). We choose one lag
for the VAR, based on the Schwarz information criterion. The model parameters are estimated using the
method proposed by Towbin and Weber (2013). Given the inaccuracy of analytical standard errors which
rely on first-order asymptotics, we use bootstrapped standard errors instead with 50 bootstrap iterations.
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We evaluate the coefficients at both values of the ZLB dummy variable and then compute the impulse
responses of housing returns to a negative one-standard-deviation shock, which is estimated to be 17.3018
basis points, in the mortgage rate. The impulse response functions and the bootstrapped 90% confidence
intervals in both the ZLB and non-ZLB regimes are depicted in Figure 2. The horizontal axis of the
impulse response functions shows the number of periods (months) that have passed after the impulse has
been realized while the vertical axis measures the response of the variable of interest, i.e., housing returns.
We also present the impulse responses (only in the first 20 periods to save space) and the corresponding
percent deviations from the sample average of monthly housing returns in the appendix Table A1.














Figure 2: Responses of housing returns to a negative one-standard-deviation mortgage rate
shock in ZLB and non-ZLB regimes
Figure 2 and Table A1 provide strong evidence for heterogeneous impacts of the mortgage rate shock
on housing returns. The responses of housing returns to the mortgage rate shock are much stronger in
the ZLB regime compared to the non-ZLB regime, a result in line with our first hypothesis. In the ZLB
regime, housing returns increase right after the shock and the impact reaches its maximum about a year
later when housing returns increase by 5.1550 basis points or about 31.45% deviation from the sample
average. In the non-ZLB regime, however, the impact on housing returns is initially negative. It becomes
positive a quarter later and reaches its maximum after another year. The maximum impact is only half the
size of that in the ZLB regime.
The positive impact of a mortgage rate decrease on housing returns is long-lasting and large in magni-
tude when the policy rate is near zero. This finding is consistent with the ongoing housing market boom
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in the U.S. following the 2019-2020 period of falling mortgage rates and the lowering of the federal funds
rate to near zero in early 2020 in response to the economic downturn caused by the global outbreak of
Covid-19.6 Given that the federal funds rate is likely to stay near zero until at least 2024, as repeat-
edly signalled by the Federal Reserve chairman Jerome Powell, the impact of the mortgage rate decrease
in 2019 and 2020 on housing returns is expected to stay positive and outweigh the downward pressure
caused by the recent surge in mortgage rates at least in the near future. As the positive impact dies down
and the negative impact of rising mortgage rates, which started in February 2021, becomes more dominant
at some point in time, housing returns will likely start to decline at a fast pace if the policy rate stays low.
By analyzing a history of large price run-ups in U.S. state-level housing markets, Sun and Tsang (2019)
find that a sharper run-up in house prices predicts a higher probability of a crash. In light of their finding,
our results point out the importance of avoiding mortgage rates from climbing too fast in maintaining
healthy housing markets following the ongoing boom. This brings challenges to the Fed when it comes to
the plan of reducing its monthly bond purchases, given inflation pressures, before raising the policy rate.
At the recent Federal Open Market Committee meetings, officials have started discussions/debates about
reducing the pace of asset purchases.7
4.2 The effects of housing supply and demand factors
Having illustrated the difference in the housing return responses between two policy rate regimes, we
then evaluate the effects of housing supply and demand factors, including the number of housing permits,
real personal income, nonfarm employment, and population. While the ZLB regime is a dummy variable,
our measures of housing permits, personal income, employment, and popuation are all continuous. We let
the variable X be one of the these four factors at a time, estimate the model parameters, and compute the
6The article from the Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/surging-u-s-home-prices-gaining-momentum-as-
rally-intensifies-11613062810, shows that, according to the median sales price for existing homes in more than 180 metro
areas tracked by the National Association of Realtors, the U.S. home prices are rising at an accelerating pace. The U.S. is
experiencing the strongest housing boom in more than a decade.
7See the July 2021 Wall Street Journal article “Fed Officials See Earlier End for Bond Buying, Emphasize
Patience" at https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-debated-how-to-begin-pulling-back-on-stimulus-at-june-meeting-11625680801
and the August 2021 Wall Street Journal article “Fed Signals Asset Purchases Likely to Slow This Year" at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-debated-timing-mechanics-of-stimulus-pullback-at-july-meeting-11629309648.
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impulse response functions at a Low (10th) percentile and a High (90th) percentile value of the X variable
and in both policy rate regimes. The impulse responses and the bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals
are depicted in Figure 3. While we observe a difference in the housing return responses evaluated at Low
versus High values of each X variable in the non-ZLB regime, a greater difference stands out in the ZLB
regime. In particular, housing returns increase by a larger extent following a negative mortgage rate shock
in the case of less housing permits, higher personal income, higher employment, or larger population. We
explore the role of these factors in detail one by one.
A. Housing permits
The effects of housing permits are shown in Table A2 in the appendix, where we report the responses of
housing returns in the first 20 periods following a negative one-standard-deviation shock to the mortgage
rate and the corresponding percent deviations from the sample average, evaluated at the 90th and 10th
percentiles of housing permits in each policy rate regime. In line with Table A1, the impact of a negative
mortgage rate shock on housing returns is generally larger when the policy rate is near zero. Not all states
are impacted equally. In particular, when the policy rate is not constrained by the ZLB, housing returns
decrease in the first several months following the shock, irrespective of the level of housing permits.
When the policy rate is at the ZLB, a negative mortgage shock heightens housing returns right away by
3.2 basis points (or about 20% deviation from the sample average) and the impact reaches its maximum
at 4.2 basis points (or about 25% deviation from the sample average) after half a year in states with High
housing permits. In states with Low housing permits, however, the impact is small in size initially and
then increases gradually and reaches its maximum a year after the shock when housing returns increase by
more than 6 basis points (or 37% deviation from the sample average). The intuition behind this finding is
straightforward. A mortgage rate decrease heats up housing demand and returns, and the effect strengthens
when less housing units are allowed to be built, which restricts housing supply. These results confirm our
hypothesis that a mortgage rate shock has heterogeneous effects on housing returns conditional on the
state of the macroeconomy (captured by the ZLB of the policy rate), local supply conditions, and their
interactions. Our results are consistent with the finding of Kishor and Morley (2015) at the metropolitan




Personal income also affects the response of housing returns to a negative shock to the mortgage rate;
see the appendix Table A3. In the non-ZLB regime, housing returns decline in the first three months and
increase thereafter. The impact of the mortgage rate shock on housing returns is long-lasting and reaches
its maximum around 15 months after the shock, with a larger impact on states with higher personal income
than those with lower personal income. In the ZLB regime, housing returns increase almost immediately
following the negative mortgage rate shock and personal income tends to matter even more. In states with
Low personal income, the maximum impact of the shock on housing returns is about 3.55 basis points (or
22% deviation from the sample average). In contrast, the maximum magnitude is 6.66 basis points (or
41% deviation from the sample average) in states with High personal income. Given that personal income
is an important determinant of housing demand in local markets, an increase in personal income reinforces
the surge in housing returns caused by lowered mortgage rates.
C. Employment
Table A4 in the appendix shows the effects of employment, another determinant of housing demand
in local markets, on the responses of housing returns to a negative mortgage rate shock. When the federal
funds rate is not near zero, housing returns decrease for 3 months and then start to increase, to a larger
extent in states with higher employment. It takes around 15 months for the impact of the negative mortgage
rate shock to reach a peak, irrespective of the level of employment. The shock leads to larger increases
in housing returns when the policy rate gets stuck at zero, especially in states with High employment. In
line with our expectation, an increase in employment also reinforces the surge in housing returns caused
by lowered mortgage rates.
D. Population
Table A5 in the appendix shows the effects of population. Similar to personal income and employment,
population also affects local housing demand positively. The table shows that a negative mortgage rate
8Kishor and Morley (2015) use the geography-based measure of Saiz (2010) and the regulation-based measure from the
Wharton Regulation Index of Gyourko et al. (2008) to measure supply elasticity. However, there are no time-series data on
these housing supply elasticities and only the cross-sectional variation could be exploited. Instead, we use time-varying housing
permits to measure supply-side conditions of housing markets.
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shock increases housing returns, to a larger extent in states with High population and during times when the
policy rate is constrained by the zero lower bound. These results confirm our hypothesis that a mortgage
rate shock has heterogeneous effects on housing returns conditional on the state of the macroeconomy,
local demand conditions, and their interactions.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of housing returns to a negative one-standard-deviation mortgage rate
shock and the effects of supply and demand factors
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4.3 Further discussion: heterogeneous mortgage rates across states
We find strong evidence for heterogeneous effects of a mortgage rate shock on housing returns across
U.S. states, conditional on the ZLB of the federal funds rate, local supply and demand factors, and their
interactions. One might suspect that our results are driven by differential mortgage rates across regions,
which could potentially be determined by local supply and demand factors, rather than heterogeneous
responses of housing returns to changes in mortgage rates. While mortgage rates indeed vary across states,
we use the 30-year fixed rate mortgage average, which is common to all states and non-responsive to state-
level housing returns, in the IPVAR model so that an exogenous shock to the mortgage rate can be properly
identified. In order to rule out the possibility that our results are driven by differential mortgage rates across
states, we collect the state-level effective mortgage rate data (available only at annual frequency) between
1995 and 2018 from the Monthly Interest Rate Survey of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
The sample ends in 2018 due to the discontinuation of FHFA’s Monthly Interest Rate Survey in 2019. We
present the summary statistics of state-level effective mortgage rates in Table 3. Results show that variation
in effective mortgage rates is dominated by variation within states over time rather than that across states.
In line with Ozanne and Thibodeau (1983), Jud and Epley (1991), and Kim and Bhattacharya (2009),
differences in terms of mortgage rates across different regions are insignificant.
Table 3: Summary statistics of state-level effective mortgage rates
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Overall 5.8215 1.4201 3.5578 8.4600
Between 0.0814 5.6393 5.9915
Within 1.4178 3.5010 8.3506
We then regress the difference between state-level effective mortgage rates and the 30-year fixed rate
mortgage average against local housing permits, income, employment, and population for each year be-
tween 1995 and 2018. We report the coefficients of determination from yearly cross-sectional regressions
in Table 4.
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Table 4: Coefficients of determination
Year Adj. R2 Year Adj. R2 Year Adj. R2 Year Adj. R2
1995 -0.0473 2001 -0.0633 2007 0.0333 2013 0.1262
1996 0.0090 2002 0.1543 2008 0.0502 2014 0.2712
1997 0.0473 2003 -0.0188 2009 0.1496 2015 0.2145
1998 0.0051 2004 0.0314 2010 0.0852 2016 0.3519
1999 0.1527 2005 0.0493 2011 0.0351 2017 0.4197
2000 0.0922 2006 0.1700 2012 -0.0075 2018 0.2356
Min -0.0632 Max 0.4197 Median 0.0677 Mean 0.1061
The table shows that local supply and demand factors altogether have limited explanatory power for
the cross-state variation in mortgage rates. Between 1995 and 2018, those factors explain an average of
10 percent of the variation in mortgage rates across states. Even though their explanatory power improves
in recent years, the adjusted R2 is mostly lower than 10 percent before 2014, including the years when the
federal funds rate stays in the ZLB regime in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
It is worth noting that the test presented in this section is based on single-equation regressions. Our
goal is not to explore what determines regional mortgage rates. Instead, we aim at examining what fraction
of the variation in regional mortgage rates is driven by the four specific local supply and demand factors,
i.e., housing permits, income, employment, and population. The result that these factors have limited
explanatory power for the cross-state variation in mortgage rates provides further support for our finding
of heterogeneous responses of housing returns to a mortgage rate shock across states. For discussions on
regional variation of mortgage rates, see for example Ostas (1977), Morrell and Saba (1983), Jameson
et al. (1986), and especially Jameson et al. (1990), who address the simultaneity bias of single equation
models used in the context of studying regional differences in mortgage yields using a two-stage least
squares approach.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops an empirical and theoretical framework to examine how the impact of a mortgage
rate shock on housing returns is altered by local supply and demand conditions. We build a partial equi-
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librium model which shows that the effect of mortgage rate changes on the return of housing is dependent
on the zero lower bound regime of the policy interest rate, local supply and demand conditions, and their
interactions. This finding is supported by our empirical results, which originate from an IPVAR model
estimated on data including 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia for a period ranging from January
1995 to December 2020.
Our theoretical and empirical models draw a clear and unambiguous picture. Supply and demand
conditions matter for the impact of mortgage rate fluctuations. This is especially true during times when
the policy interest rate hits the zero lower bound. We find that the zero lower bound on the federal funds
rate intensifies the housing return responses to a mortgage rate shock, with and without accounting for
demand and supply factors in local housing markets. This paper has important policy implications in the
post-Covid-19 era when the U.S. is experiencing a nationwide housing boom and a surge in mortgage
rates, while the federal funds rate is expected to stay near zero at least until 2024.
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Appendix
Table A1: Responses of housing returns to a negative one-standard-
deviation mortgage rate shock in ZLB and non-ZLB regimes
ZLB=1 ZLB=0
Period Change % deviation Change % deviation
1 0.9259 5.65 % -2.0191 -12.32 %
2 1.9371 11.82 % -1.0348 -6.31 %
3 2.7586 16.83 % -0.2160 -1.32 %
4 3.4182 20.86 % 0.4609 2.81 %
5 3.9399 24.04 % 1.0163 6.20 %
6 4.3444 26.51 % 1.4678 8.96 %
7 4.6496 28.37 % 1.8307 11.17 %
8 4.8709 29.72 % 2.1180 12.92 %
9 5.0214 30.64 % 2.3411 14.28 %
10 5.1127 31.19 % 2.5098 15.31 %
11 5.1544 31.45 % 2.6325 16.06 %
12 5.1550 31.45 % 2.7165 16.57 %
13 5.1217 31.25 % 2.7679 16.89 %
14 5.0606 30.88 % 2.7922 17.04 %
15 4.9770 30.37 % 2.7939 17.05 %
16 4.8753 29.75 % 2.7769 16.94 %
17 4.7595 29.04 % 2.7447 16.75 %
18 4.6327 28.27 % 2.7002 16.47 %
19 4.4977 27.44 % 2.6457 16.14 %
20 4.3568 26.58 % 2.5833 15.76 %
The change is expressed in basis points.
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Table A2: Responses of housing returns to a negative one-standard-deviation
mortgage rate shock and the effects of housing permits
X = Housing permits
High X & ZLB=1 High X & ZLB=0 Low X & ZLB=1 Low X & ZLB=0
Period Change % deviation Change % deviation Change % deviation Change % deviation
1 3.2007 19.53 % -2.1182 -12.92 % -0.1370 -0.84 % -1.8598 -11.35 %
2 3.5310 21.54 % -0.8766 -5.35 % 1.2887 7.86 % -1.1944 -7.29 %
3 3.7792 23.06 % 0.1509 0.92 % 2.4533 14.97 % -0.6389 -3.90 %
4 3.9582 24.15 % 0.9954 6.07 % 3.3953 20.72 % -0.1775 -1.08 %
5 4.0791 24.89 % 1.6836 10.27 % 4.1477 25.31 % 0.2033 1.24 %
6 4.1513 25.33 % 2.2387 13.66 % 4.7392 28.92 % 0.5153 3.14 %
7 4.1831 25.52 % 2.6806 16.35 % 5.1943 31.69 % 0.7686 4.69 %
8 4.1813 25.51 % 3.0263 18.46 % 5.5341 33.77 % 0.9720 5.93 %
9 4.1520 25.33 % 3.2906 20.08 % 5.7768 35.25 % 1.1328 6.91 %
10 4.1001 25.02 % 3.4861 21.27 % 5.9380 36.23 % 1.2575 7.67 %
11 4.0301 24.59 % 3.6237 22.11 % 6.0310 36.80 % 1.3518 8.25 %
12 3.9456 24.07 % 3.7127 22.65 % 6.0673 37.02 % 1.4204 8.67 %
13 3.8497 23.49 % 3.7612 22.95 % 6.0566 36.95 % 1.4673 8.95 %
14 3.7451 22.85 % 3.7761 23.04 % 6.0075 36.65 % 1.4961 9.13 %
15 3.6341 22.17 % 3.7631 22.96 % 5.9270 36.16 % 1.5099 9.21 %
16 3.5184 21.47 % 3.7273 22.74 % 5.8211 35.52 % 1.5111 9.22 %
17 3.3998 20.74 % 3.6729 22.41 % 5.6952 34.75 % 1.5021 9.16 %
18 3.2795 20.01 % 3.6037 21.99 % 5.5536 33.88 % 1.4846 9.06 %
19 3.1587 19.27 % 3.5227 21.49 % 5.4001 32.95 % 1.4603 8.91 %
20 3.0382 18.54 % 3.4326 20.94 % 5.2376 31.96 % 1.4306 8.73 %
The change is expressed in basis points.
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Table A3: Responses of housing returns to a negative one-standard-deviation
mortgage rate shock and the effects of personal income
X = Personal income
High X & ZLB=1 High X & ZLB=0 Low X & ZLB=1 Low X & ZLB=0
Period Change % deviation Change % deviation Change % deviation Change % deviation
1 -0.0167 -0.10 % -2.5343 -15.46 % 1.9615 11.97 % -1.4496 -8.84 %
2 1.5117 9.22 % -1.2805 -7.81 % 2.4031 14.66 % -0.7596 -4.63 %
3 2.7619 16.85 % -0.2384 -1.45 % 2.7513 16.79 % -0.1856 -1.13 %
4 3.7745 23.03 % 0.6224 3.80 % 3.0203 18.43 % 0.2889 1.76 %
5 4.5845 27.97 % 1.3280 8.10 % 3.2222 19.66 % 0.6782 4.14 %
6 5.2221 31.86 % 1.9010 11.60 % 3.3674 20.55 % 0.9946 6.07 %
7 5.7134 34.86 % 2.3609 14.40 % 3.4650 21.14 % 1.2490 7.62 %
8 6.0809 37.10 % 2.7246 16.62 % 3.5226 21.49 % 1.4505 8.85 %
9 6.3438 38.71 % 3.0064 18.34 % 3.5469 21.64 % 1.6071 9.81 %
10 6.5188 39.77 % 3.2190 19.64 % 3.5435 21.62 % 1.7257 10.53 %
11 6.6201 40.39 % 3.3731 20.58 % 3.5174 21.46 % 1.8120 11.06 %
12 6.6600 40.63 % 3.4779 21.22 % 3.4727 21.19 % 1.8713 11.42 %
13 6.6491 40.57 % 3.5415 21.61 % 3.4130 20.82 % 1.9078 11.64 %
14 6.5962 40.25 % 3.5705 21.78 % 3.3413 20.39 % 1.9254 11.75 %
15 6.5092 39.71 % 3.5709 21.79 % 3.2602 19.89 % 1.9271 11.76 %
16 6.3946 39.02 % 3.5477 21.65 % 3.1718 19.35 % 1.9159 11.69 %
17 6.2580 38.18 % 3.5053 21.39 % 3.0780 18.78 % 1.8940 11.56 %
18 6.1041 37.24 % 3.4471 21.03 % 2.9805 18.18 % 1.8635 11.37 %
19 5.9371 36.22 % 3.3765 20.60 % 2.8804 17.57 % 1.8261 11.14 %
20 5.7602 35.14 % 3.2960 20.11 % 2.7789 16.95 % 1.7832 10.88 %
The change is expressed in basis points.
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Table A4: Responses of housing returns to a negative one-standard-deviation
mortgage rate shock and the effects of employment
X = Employment
High X & ZLB=1 High X & ZLB=0 Low X & ZLB=1 Low X & ZLB=0
Period Change % deviation Change % deviation Change % deviation Change % deviation
1 -0.0745 -0.45 % -2.5262 -15.41 % 2.0269 12.37 % -1.4485 -8.84 %
2 1.4663 8.95 % -1.3005 -7.93 % 2.4627 15.03 % -0.7322 -4.47 %
3 2.7271 16.64 % -0.2813 -1.72 % 2.8058 17.12 % -0.1368 -0.83 %
4 3.7486 22.87 % 0.5608 3.42 % 3.0702 18.73 % 0.3550 2.17 %
5 4.5661 27.86 % 1.2514 7.64 % 3.2679 19.94 % 0.7581 4.63 %
6 5.2100 31.79 % 1.8126 11.06 % 3.4095 20.80 % 1.0855 6.62 %
7 5.7066 34.82 % 2.2633 13.81 % 3.5037 21.38 % 1.3482 8.23 %
8 6.0785 37.09 % 2.6201 15.99 % 3.5583 21.71 % 1.5560 9.49 %
9 6.3450 38.71 % 2.8969 17.67 % 3.5799 21.84 % 1.7171 10.48 %
10 6.5230 39.80 % 3.1061 18.95 % 3.5741 21.81 % 1.8385 11.22 %
11 6.6268 40.43 % 3.2581 19.88 % 3.5458 21.63 % 1.9266 11.75 %
12 6.6687 40.69 % 3.3619 20.51 % 3.4991 21.35 % 1.9865 12.12 %
13 6.6593 40.63 % 3.4254 20.90 % 3.4375 20.97 % 2.0228 12.34 %
14 6.6077 40.32 % 3.4552 21.08 % 3.3641 20.53 % 2.0394 12.44 %
15 6.5216 39.79 % 3.4570 21.09 % 3.2814 20.02 % 2.0396 12.44 %
16 6.4077 39.09 % 3.4357 20.96 % 3.1917 19.47 % 2.0264 12.36 %
17 6.2715 38.26 % 3.3955 20.72 % 3.0966 18.89 % 2.0021 12.22 %
18 6.1180 37.33 % 3.3400 20.38 % 2.9979 18.29 % 1.9690 12.01 %
19 5.9511 36.31 % 3.2722 19.96 % 2.8967 17.67 % 1.9286 11.77 %
20 5.7742 35.23 % 3.1948 19.49 % 2.7942 17.05 % 1.8827 11.49 %
The change is expressed in basis points.
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Table A5: Responses of housing returns to a negative one-standard-deviation
mortgage rate shock and the effects of population
X = Population
High X & ZLB=1 High X & ZLB=0 Low X & ZLB=1 Low X & ZLB=0
Period Change % deviation Change % deviation Change % deviation Change % deviation
1 0.1758 1.07 % -2.5530 -15.58 % 1.8331 11.18 % -1.3789 -8.41 %
2 1.6454 10.04 % -1.3234 -8.07 % 2.2914 13.98 % -0.6820 -4.16 %
3 2.8463 17.37 % -0.3009 -1.84 % 2.6542 16.19 % -0.1028 -0.63 %
4 3.8177 23.29 % 0.5442 3.32 % 2.9359 17.91 % 0.3754 2.29 %
5 4.5935 28.03 % 1.2374 7.55 % 3.1488 19.21 % 0.7672 4.68 %
6 5.2029 31.74 % 1.8008 10.99 % 3.3036 20.16 % 1.0852 6.62 %
7 5.6711 34.60 % 2.2534 13.75 % 3.4094 20.80 % 1.3402 8.18 %
8 6.0197 36.73 % 2.6118 15.94 % 3.4743 21.20 % 1.5417 9.41 %
9 6.2676 38.24 % 2.8902 17.63 % 3.5049 21.38 % 1.6977 10.36 %
10 6.4307 39.24 % 3.1006 18.92 % 3.5070 21.40 % 1.8151 11.07 %
11 6.5228 39.80 % 3.2537 19.85 % 3.4857 21.27 % 1.8999 11.59 %
12 6.5558 40.00 % 3.3585 20.49 % 3.4451 21.02 % 1.9574 11.94 %
13 6.5398 39.90 % 3.4228 20.88 % 3.3890 20.68 % 1.9919 12.15 %
14 6.4836 39.56 % 3.4532 21.07 % 3.3204 20.26 % 2.0072 12.25 %
15 6.3945 39.01 % 3.4556 21.08 % 3.2420 19.78 % 2.0066 12.24 %
16 6.2790 38.31 % 3.4348 20.96 % 3.1560 19.26 % 1.9929 12.16 %
17 6.1424 37.48 % 3.3950 20.71 % 3.0643 18.70 % 1.9685 12.01 %
18 5.9893 36.54 % 3.3399 20.38 % 2.9685 18.11 % 1.9354 11.81 %
19 5.8236 35.53 % 3.2724 19.97 % 2.8700 17.51 % 1.8953 11.56 %
20 5.6486 34.46 % 3.1953 19.50 % 2.7698 16.90 % 1.8498 11.29 %
The change is expressed in basis points.
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